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INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK GAMES
WITH LINEAR BEST RESPONSES
BENJAMIN GOLUB
ABSTRACT. This note, suitable for a lecture in an advanced undergrad-
uate or basic graduate course on the economic theory of networks, ex-
posits basic ideas of linear best-response games and their equilibria.
1. BASIC SETUP AND RESULTS
Westudy the gameof Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006), who
introduced the idea of the connection between Nash equilibria of a cer-
tain kind of game and centrality measures that we will derive is due to
them.
Consider a complete-information gamewhere each player (also called
agent) i ∈N = {1,2, . . . ,n} simultaneously selects a real-valued action ai ≥
0 and receives a real-valued payoff ui (a1,a2, . . . ,an) that depends on ev-
eryone’s action. Suppose that each agent i ’s best-response function is
given by
(1) BRi (a−i )=α
∑
j
wi j a j +bi .
Here
α> 0, W = (wi j )i , j∈N , and (bi )i∈N
are constants—parameters of themodel that do not dependona= (ai )i∈N .
The matrixW is irreducible,1 with Wi i = 0 for every i , and all its entries
are nonnegative. All the bi are positive.
1.1. Existence result. Recall that r (A) is the spectral radius of a matrix
A, which has two equivalent definitions: (i) themaximumabsolute value
of any eigenvalue; and (b) the definition you studied in Problem Set 1,
Problem 4.
Date: May 2018.
1We call a matrix irreducible if the corresponding weighted, directed graph is strongly
connected. A 1-by-1 nonnegative matrix is said to be irreducible if its sole entry is posi-
tive.
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Theorem 1. If r (αW ) < 1 then there is exactly one pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game described above, given by
a∗ = (I −αW )−1b
=
∞∑
ℓ=0
αℓW ℓb.
The result can be established by manipulating the assumed best re-
sponses of each agent to show that as long as (I−αW )−1 is well-defined,
then
a∗ = (I −αW )−1b.
It is left as an exercise to show that (I −αW )−1 exists, has the claimed
Neumann series expansion, and is nonnegative.2
1.2. Interpreting the entries ofW ℓ. For any walk s = (i (1), i (2), . . . , i (ℓ+
1)) define its weight to be the product of the weights of the edges consti-
tuting that walk:
λ(s)=wi (1)i (2)wi (2)i (3) · · ·wi (ℓ)i (ℓ+1).
Let W ℓ(W ; i , j ) be the set of all walks of length ℓ from i to j .
Fact 1. The following identity holds: for every positive integer ℓ,
(W ℓ)i j =
∑
s∈W ℓ(W ;i , j )
λ(s).
That is, the (i , j ) entry of W ℓ is the sum of the weights of walks of
length ℓ from i to j . Think about the special case ofW =G. This boils
down to counting walks.
What do these walks correspond to game-theoretically? In view of the
formula a∗ =
∑∞
ℓ=0α
ℓW ℓb, the indirect effect of perturbations to bi on
the action a j via chains of best responses of length ℓ. For a different in-
terpretationof the walks, in terms of a process of iterated best-responses,
see (Golub and Sadler, 2016, Section 3.1.3).
2Let A be an irreducible n-by-n matrix whose entries are all nonnegative. (a) Assume
that
∑∞
k=K
Ak tends to the all-zeros matrix entrywise as K →∞. Show that
(I −A)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
Ak ,
where I is an appropriately-sized identity matrix. That is, show that the expression∑∞
k=0A
k is well-defined and that it is the inverse of the matrix I −A. (b) Conclude
that all the entries of (I −A)−1 are nonnegative. (c) Using the Perron-Frobenius Theo-
rem, show that the assumption (first sentence) of (a) holds if the spectral radius ofA is
strictly less than 1.
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2. BONACICH CENTRALITY
Definition 1. Let Ŵ be a nonnegative irreduciblematrix, α̂ ∈ (0,r (Ŵ )−1)
be a real number, and b̂ a nonnegative base vector. Then the vector of
Bonacich centralities in Ŵ with parameter α̂ and base vector b̂ is defined
to be
β(Ŵ ; α̂, b̂)= (I −αŴ )−1b̂.
The “default” value of b is 1, the vector of all ones.
We are using hats to distinguish these from the parameters of our game,
since the arguments ofβ can be anything (though of course we will apply
it to the game shortly). Note that the Bonacich centrality satisfies
β = b̂+ α̂Ŵβ.
The idea behind this equation is that βi is a measure of i ’s network
centrality. It is the sum of a “base” level b̂i and a socially derived part
α̂
∑
j Ŵi jβ j , where Ŵi j describes the part ofβ j that accrues to i . The nat-
ural interpretation in many cases is that Ŵi j is the amount of attention
that i gets from j , so is naturally interpreted as a link from j to i .
The reference for this notion is Bonacich (1987). However, Leontief
studied very similar “centrality” measures around 30 years before that,
and the Leontief inverse, (I −αW )−1, comes up in the current study of
production networks (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Baqaee and Farhi, 2017).
Now, we know from the Neumann series that
β(Ŵ ; α̂, b̂)=
∞∑
ℓ=1
αℓŴ ℓb̂.
Thus we can interpret an agent’s Bonacich centrality in terms of sums of
walk weights. You did a similar thing for unweighted walks in Problem
Set 1.
In our applications, we will be interested in the Bonacich centrality
vector, β(Ŵ ; α̂, b̂), for various matrices Ŵ and various vectors b̂. For
example, clearly in our game as set up in the beginning of Section 1.1 we
may write the unique equilibrium identified in Theorem 1 as
a∗ =β(W ;α,b).
We can also describe another important aspect of our game via a dif-
ferent application of Bonacich centrality, i.e., with different parameters.
Define the total activity level by A∗ =
∑
i a
∗
i
and define the keyness of i to
be
ki =
d A∗
dbi
.
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This is the amount by which an exogenous change in bi affects the ag-
gregate equilibrium action in the game. (Though we have defined it here
as a derivative, the aggregate activity level is linear in each bi , and conse-
quently this is the slope in bi for any magnitude of change.) Players are
more “key” if reducing their bi causes a greater reduction in aggregate
activity.3 It is a good exercise to show that the keyness vector can be ex-
pressed in terms of Bonacich centrality. That, figure out how to fill in the
questionmarks in:
k=β(?;α, ?)
3. LIMITS IN WHICH LONG WALKS MATTER
3.1. The limit inwhich actions blowup. Fix all parameters, in particular
the vector b, and consider taking α ↑ r (W )−1, so that r (αW ) ↑ 1. What
happens?
Well, let’s stare at the sum
(2) a∗ =
∞∑
ℓ=0
αℓW ℓb.
We know that for each α it is well-defined and finite. But what happens
to a typical entry in the limit?
As we saw in Problem Set 1, Problem 3, the maximum entry of W ℓ
is asymptotically (as ℓ → ∞) exactly of order r (W )ℓ, i.e. in the class
Θ(r (W )ℓ). From this we can conclude that
Fact 2. As α ↑ r (W )−1, the sum (2) tends to +∞.
Give an economic interpretation of this. (Basic idea: feedback effects
get out of control because we are weighting longer and longer walks.)
3.2. A coordination game and a related, but nicer, limit. Take an irre-
ducible, nonnegative, row-stochastic4matrixΓwith γi i = 0 for each i and
setW Γ. Let b(α) = (1−α)y. Here y is fixed. Note that for fixed param-
eters this is just a special case of the general game we’ve been studying.
However, now that b depends on α, the asymptotics of this model in α
will be different from the case in which b does not depend on α from the
previous subsection.
With the parameter values described above, the game we have been
studying is a coordination game: every player wants tomatch a weighted
3This is only one way of measuring what players are key, and in order for this to be a
guide to interventions, various assumptions about costs and benefits of intervention
have to hold. See Galeotti, Golub, and Goyal (2017) for more on this, and other network
measures that might show up when wemodel the intervention differently.
4Amatrix is said to be row-stochastic if each of its rows adds up to 1.
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average of (i) own ideal action yi and (ii) a weighted average of neighbors’
actions. You should check that in i ’s best-response function
(3) BRi (a−i )=α
∑
j
γi j a j + (1−α)yi .
the weights placed on yi and the various a j ’s sum to 1.
Applying Theorem 1 to characterize the equilibrium, we find:
a∗ =
∞∑
ℓ=1
αℓΓℓb= (1−α)
∞∑
ℓ=1
αℓΓℓy.(4)
You’ll show in Problem Set 2 that every player’s action ends up being an
average of ideal points yi with certain weights.
Since it turns out that r (Γ) = 1 (the spectral radius of a row-stochastic
matrix is equal to 1) the characterization of Theorem 1 holds for allα< 1.
Note that at α = 1 corresponds to a pure coordination game, and you
should convince yourself that the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are ex-
actly the action profiles with everyone taking the same action. In partic-
ular, in theα= 1 game there is a huge amount of equilibriummultiplicity.
For any α < 1, however, the game has a unique equilibrium. Also in
Problem Set 2, you’ll verify that the equilibria as α ↑ 1 converge to a well-
defined limit in which all players take the same action, no matter what
that action is. Thus, we can think of the α ↑ 1 limit as a way to refine the
large set of equilibria in the α= 1 coordination game.
In the α ↑ 1 limit, long walks (in Γ) also matter: this follows from (3).
But now they matter in a limit that is better-behaved than the explosive
limit studied in the previous subsection. Here the long walks will deter-
mine the way in which everyone averages the ideal points yi in setting
their actions.
4. THE PERRON-FROBENIUS THEOREM
4.1. Motivation. As just discussed, we are interested in the α ↑ r (W )−1
limit of our game, which will correspond to the type of Bonacich central-
ity that
• cares as much about network effects as possible subject to being
well-defined
• cares a lot about long walks.
The next result, which is a fundamental theorem that will recur repeat-
edly, will help us think about this limit. Indeed, it will tell us essentially
everything about W ℓ for large ℓ. But getting there takes a little bit of
setup.
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4.2. Perron-Frobenius Theorem. This theorem goes a long way in the
economic analysis of networks.5 A wonderful reference on it is Carl D.
Meyer’s Matrix Analysis and Applied Linear Algebra, Chapter 8; I recom-
mend this textbook very highly. A shorter self-contained exposition can
be found in Debreu and Herstein’s 1953 paper in Econometrica (1953).
For anymatrixA, we denote by spec(A) the set of its eigenvalues. This
set is also called its spectrum.
Definition. The spectral radius ofA is defined to be
r (A)= max
λ∈spec(A)
|λ|,
which is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues ofA.
Theorem (Perron-Frobenius). LetA be an irreducible, square matrix with
no negative entries. Then:
1. The positive real number r (A) is an eigenvalue (call it λ1) ofA.
2. There is a unique vector6 p ∈ Rn+ (called a right-hand Perron vec-
tor) satisfying
∑
i pi = 1 and Ap= λ1p. All entries of this vector are
strictly positive.
3. If there is a v ∈ Rn+ \ {0} and r
′ ∈ R such that Av r ′v then v is a
positive scalar multiple of p, and r ′ =λ1.
We can apply the same result to A⊺ to obtain a unique vector q ∈ Rn+
satisfying
∑
i qi = 1 andA
⊺q = r (A⊺)q.
Because a matrix and its transpose have exactly the same eigenvalues,
the matricesA andA⊺ have the same spectral radius.7 Thus, taking the
transpose of both sides of A⊺q = r (A⊺)q, we find that q⊺ is a left-hand
eigenvector ofA satisfying q⊺A = r (A)q⊺. We will call q⊺ the left-hand
Perron vector ofA.
To summarize, the special (positive, real) eigenvalue λ1 = r (A) of the
matrixA is associated with two special eigenvectors p (on the right) and
q⊺ (on the left), each having only positive entries and each having entries
summing to 1. The vectorp is (up to normalization) the uniquenonnega-
tive right-handeigenvector of thematrixA, and the analogous statement
holds for q⊺ on the left-hand side.
5See Elliott and Golub (2018) for a use of it in the context of characterizing efficient,
rather than Nash equilibrium, outcomes.
6The notation Rn+ means the set of all vectors in R
n with nonnegative entries.
7The fact that r (A⊺) = r (A) is also easily deduced from the solution to Problem Set
1, Problem 4, as long as we accept that the definitions of r (A) given there and in the
present note are equivalent.
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You have already met r (A) from another angle, in Problem 4 of Prob-
lem Set 1, though this is the first timewe are discussing the Perron eigen-
vectors.
4.3. Application to long walks.
Proposition 1. Let A be an irreducible, square matrix with no negative
entries. Let r (A) be the its largest eigenvalue (A’s spectral radius). As α ↑
r (A)−1 we have
(1−αr (A))(I −αA)−1→
pq⊺
q⊺p
.
The right-hand side is a rank-1matrixwhose (i , j ) entry is cpi q j , where
the normalizing constant is the dot product of p and q. The proof of this
is left as an exercise.
Definition 2. A nonnegativematrixA is said to be primitive ifAℓ has all
strictly positive entries for some positive integer ℓ.
Proposition 2. The nonnegative, irreducible matrix A is primitive if and
only if
lim
ℓ→∞
Aℓ
r (A)ℓ
→
pq⊺
q⊺p
,
where p and q⊺ are the right-hand and left-hand Perron vectors of A, re-
spectively.
This is proved in (Meyer, 2000).
5. COMMENTS AND RELATED MODELS
For our purposes, this resolves the question of how influential various
individuals are on the group outcome. The results we just derived about
the behavior of longwalks are importantwhenwe study the long-run be-
havior of naive learning processes. In particular, the weight of long walks
determines one’s influence (Golub and Jackson, 2010). The rate at which
the approximations above become good is studied in (DeMarzo et al., 2003;
Golub and Jackson, 2012).
A very natural question is how to extend the analysis we have done
to incomplete information. This is done in deMartí and Zenou (2015)
Golub andMorris (2017a), and Lambert, Martini, and Ostrovsky (2018).
Golub andMorris (2017b) shows that the linear algebrawehave discussed
above is closely related to higher-order expectations, an important object
in the study of beliefs and priors generally.
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